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The rise of China’s assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region has indirectly 
compelled the US, Japan, Australia, and India to reactivate the long 
dormant Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) to coordinate their 
strategic approaches. This article analyses both form and function of 
the Quad from realist institutionalist perspective to assess the 
diplomatic and military arrangements between Quad members. Realist 
institutionalist assumes that the type of the multilateral institution, 
whether it is an alliance or a coalition, along with its size, will affect the 
decision-making structure, power distribution, and internal leverage, 
which in turn affect cohesion, war-fighting effectiveness, 
interoperability, and the organization’s legitimacy. Alongside an 
evaluative empirical analysis of Quad, this paper addresses the question 
how Quad will thrive although previous attempts at NATO-like security 
institution failed. Realist Institutionalism theory will illuminate why and 
how such informal quasi-alliances vis-à-vis China are going to be the 
structural new normal for the Indo-Pacific region. 
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Introduction 
Despite periodic turbulence since 1971, US-China bilateral relations had always 
managed to re-stabilize. However, by the 2010s, the underpinnings of U.S.-China comity 
became increasingly confrontational and volatile (Scobell 2021).  Friedberg (2011) contended 
that the US and China were ‘locked in a quiet but increasingly intense struggle for power and 
influence not only in Asia but around the world’ because ‘each [country] has strategic 
objectives that threaten the fundamental interests of the other side’. The end of Cold War 
changed China’s strategic priority from the promotion of Communist ideology to extending 
its territorial claims, especially in the South China Sea (Hayton, 2014; Raine & Le Miere, 2013). 




The concurrent rise of China’s economic power – particularly after joining WTO – has resulted 
in the expansion of its military might and influence, turning its status from a rising power into 
a serious competitor for global dominance against the US (Acharya, 2014; Allison, 2017; 
Mearsheimer, 2014) while Beijing’s assertion of claims over the majority of the South China 
Sea has hindered its bilateral defence relationships with the smaller powers in the Indo-Pacific 
region (Abdul Muein Abadi 2021; 2019).  
From the US perspective, the Indo-Pacific spans two oceans and several continents, 
making it important to U.S. maritime interests. In 2019, $1.9 trillion worth of U.S. trade passed 
through the region (Smith 2021).  This reality prompt the US to activate a long-dormant 
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) with Japan, Australia, and India to exchange views 
on current security challenges and coordinate their strategic approaches. The Quad is 
supposedly an Asian NATO that will act as a bulwark against a rising and assertive China. 
However, Quad is a loose grouping rather than a formal alliance (Chowdhury 2021). Japan 
initially emphasized the democratic identity of the four members, whereas India more 
comfortable emphasizing functional cooperation. Australian leaders, on the other hand, have 
been reluctant to create the impression that the group is a formal alliance. However, in 2021, 
all four countries have become more aligned in their shared concerns about China’s 
increasingly assertive behavior in the region. All four navies participated in their first joint 
exercise in over a decade in November 2020, and in March 2021, U.S. President Joe Biden 
convened a virtual Quad meeting attended by Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, 
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga (Smith 
2021).  
Contemporary coalition warfare reveals that U.S. military remains unrivaled and will 
be difficult for China to match for some time to come. This has to do with its military alliance 
– not just with the technology, capability, and level of training and war experience of the U.S. 
military. Nevertheless, military alliances provide constraints and opportunities for states 
seeking to advance their interests around the globe. To date, this alliance system did augment 
U.S. fighting capacity and solidify the country’s position as a global hegemon through the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, military alliance are not always well 
designed, nor do they always augment fighting effectiveness as well as they could since they 
sometimes act as drag on state capacity (Weitsman 2013). To that end, this article assess how 
and to what degree the emerging US-led Quad platform serve as a vehicle for projecting U.S. 
power vis-à-vis China at the South China Sea and the Indo-Pacific region.  
 
Literature Review 
Since this research specifically aims to assess the qualitative strength of the military 
alliance of the US-led Quad vis-à-vis China, this article utilize realist institutionalism as its 
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theoretical core. Patricia Weitsman (2013) develops the theory by first articulating the 
concept of realist institutions as ‘arenas through which states advance their goals and 
manifest their capabilities’. While realists argue that institutions have no independent effect 
on state behavior, liberal institutionalists argue that institutions alter state preferences, and 
thus state behavior. Yet the truth lies somewhere in between. International institutions—sets 
of interrelated regulative and procedural norms and rules that pertain to the activities of 
states and other actors in the system—serve as conduits for the actualization of capabilities. 
Institutions are binding mechanisms that alter the strategic opportunities for states, but not 
simply in the ways that liberal institutionalists would suggest. While liberal institutionalists 
demonstrate how institutions allow states to escape the prisoner’s dilemma, what they fail 
to recognize is that institutions may also provide a permissive environment for warfare. This 
is the unintended consequence of having institutions that span the globe at the ready to 
confront threats—interventions are possible; troops and assets stand at the ready. Realist 
Institutionalism recognizes that institutions can serve as conduits for state power in ways that 
are not recognized by realists or institutionalists. 
In essence, realist institutionalism regards both military alliances and coalitions that 
are constructed to prosecute wars are institutions: ‘they are a general pattern of activity, a 
humanly constructed arrangement formally organized with identifiable norms and rules for 
achieving participating states’ objectives’ (Weitsman 2013). To that end, while both alliance 
and coalition serve as vehicles for states to promote their agendas, both institutions also 
augment power not by simply adding the power of others to their own, but rather through 
achieving ends that not only are rational but also enhance the power, soft or otherwise, of 
states. However, Weitsman cautioned that while some components of military alliance 
advance the strategic aims of partner states, other mechanisms inhibit such efficiency in 
important ways (p.4). There are several ways in which institutional structure impinges on war-
fighting effectiveness and alliance or coalition cohesion depending on the following indicators 
constructed by Weitsman (2013): 
• ‘Did the operation entail the use of an alliance or coalition? 
• What were the decision-making structures employed to manage the operation? 
• To what extent did fighting multilaterally culminate in challenges in interoperability, burden 
sharing, and/or friendly fire? 
• What was the power distribution within the coalition or alliance? Did it affect the cohesion, 
fighting effectiveness, and/or leverage of states within the coalition or alliance? In other 
words, did small states have disproportionate leverage over powerful states in negotiating 
participation and continued involvement in the operation? Did fears of abandonment 
mediate U.S. actions, and fears of entrapment dominate its partners’ actions? 




• To what extent did the size of the alliance or coalition affect cohesion and costs associated 
with multilateral war fighting? Did interoperability challenges grow with coalition or alliance 
size? 
• Finally, does legitimacy really inhere in the size of the coalition or alliance? Or does it inhere 
to the mission of the operation?’ 
The causal connections flow from whether the multilateral institution is an alliance or a 
coalition and its size, which affect the decision-making structure, power distribution, and 
internal leverage, which in turn affect cohesion, war-fighting effectiveness, interoperability, 
and legitimacy (Weitsman 2013, p.190). In coalition cases, significant interoperability 
challenges hampered the military operations, and the larger the coalition, the more 
challenges the states faced. Decision-making structure definitely mediated this effect; 
straightforward, hierarchical decision-making institutions fostered effectiveness. In the 
alliance cases, more effectiveness and fewer interoperability challenges are expected.  
However, the downside of multilateral war fighting is that even at the most integrated level, 
interoperability challenges will remain as long as the sovereign state system endures. Friendly 
fire may be more likely with more countries involved.  Multilateral war fighting is not always 
more cost effective than unilateral approaches, nor does it necessarily augment legitimacy. 
To that end, this article applies a theoretical lenses to study a significant geopolitical event by 




For data collection, this study adopted a qualitative approach with two main 
procedures: primary document analysis as well as secondary data collection.  This research 
also collected official documents of all relevant parties – Ministry of Defense, as well as 
leaders’ statements. These data are in the form of annual reports, policy statements, 
ministry’s official periodicals, etc. Data also collected through secondary reports and 
comments published in newspapers, portals, and magazines.  These data collection strategy 
is known as ‘media and secondary source collection’ (Lamont 2015, p.81) and they can be in 
the form of local as well as international portals.   
To analyze the data systematically, three procedures involved: firstly, an inquiry on 
the structural conditions (the rivalry between the US and China); secondly, inquiry on the 
intra-Quad relations; thirdly, inquiry on the Quad alliance war-fighting capability assessment. 
The procedures stem from this study's intention to capture parsimonious explanations of the 
Quad military alliance strength from the realist institutionalism perspective. This is in line with 
Bennet (2008) reasoning: “while researchers must guard against possible confirmation biases 
in deriving a theory from a case and then testing it in the same case, it is possible to derive an 
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explanation from a case and then test it against different and independent evidence from 
within that same case” (Bennet 2008, p.705).    
 
Result and Discussion 
This section evaluate the Quad from realist institutionalism theory, comparing the 
platform’s current arrangement according to several causal indicators which in turn affect 
cohesion, war-fighting effectiveness, interoperability, and legitimacy: its pattern of 
multilateral institution (an alliance or a coalition), its size, the decision-making structure, and 
internal power distribution. From the first realist institutionalist perspective, it is clear that 
the Quad is gradually being transformed from an informal coalition into a more established 
military alliance. The increased pattern of naval exercises in the Indo-Pacific region signaling 
the political will from all four Quad members to address the possible future interoperability, 
and burden sharing issues – the way NATO did following the end of WWII. In combination, 
both push—the strategic challenge posed by China—and the pull factor—a renewed 
American commitment —gives rise to the momentum of the Quad to push for great military 
and strategic cooperation. India, for instance, substantially upgrading its strategic 
partnerships with the other Quad members: in August 2016, New Delhi signed the The 
Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) with the US to provide mutual 
military access to each other’s facilities; in December 2016, India became the US Major 
Defence Partner, on par with Washington’s closest allies (Saran & Verma, 2019); Japan and 
India upgraded their relationship to a Special Strategic and Global Partnership in September 
2014, before further upgraded to Japan and India Vision 2025, Special Strategic and Global 
Partnership, Working Together for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the 
World (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019). Australia and India upgraded their 
relationship to the level of Strategic Partnership in 2009 while defence cooperation was 
expanded in November 2014 to include regular defence-ministerial meetings and maritime 
exercises (India Ministry of External Affairs, 2017).  
It must be noted that previously, India and Australia had been hesitant and not only 
resisted calls to upgrade the Quad but also called it off to preserve their economic interest 
with China. The Quad previously was ended ultimately because of Australian and Indian 
concerns about China’s reaction. Such caution was reasonable at that time; that was the time 
when the former China President Hu Jintao’s promoting the narrative of China’s peaceful rise. 
However, the increased pattern of China’s assertive behavior – not only in the Indo-Pacific, 
but also across the globe under their Belt and Road Initiative scheme – compelled both New 
Delhi and Canberra to eventually participate in Quad ministerial level meeting; signaling the 
end of their accommodative stance towards China. The return of the Quad on the back of the 
Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) visions is evidence that this balance has shifted; both 




Canberra and New Delhi now acknowledge that the cost of appeasing Beijing has now 
exceeded the cost of hedging against an increasingly great threat (Kliem 2020). 
The sudden increase in Quad’s diplomatic consolidation are concurrently 
accompanied by a great increase in their military cooperation. In November 2020, Exercise 
MALABAR 2020 has been conducted involving the Australian HMAS Ballarat together with 
Indian Navy Ships Shakti, Ranvijay, Sukanya, Shivalik; Indian submarine Sindhuraj; Indian 
Navy aircraft; United States Ship John S. McCain and Japanese Ship Ōnami (Borah 2020). 
Initially, Exercise Malabar began as bilateral exercises between India and the US back in 1992 
and was expanded to include Japan only in 2015. Australia used to participate once in 2007, 
and it was finally invited back in 2020 (Borah 2020). Australian Minister for Defence, Senator 
Linda Reynolds said the imperative to cooperate closely with regional defence partners on 
‘shared challenges’ – implicitly referring to China – was stronger than ever:  
“Exercise MALABAR is an important opportunity to work in concert with like-minded 
nations to support a secure, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific region…Participation in 
sophisticated exercises like MALABAR not only highlights the strategic trust between 
the members, but also strengthens our collective ability to contribute to regional 
security…India and Australia are natural partners in the Indo-Pacific, and Exercise 
MALABAR is a clear demonstration of the depth of trust and cooperation between our 
defence organisations.”  
During the exercise, the four participating navies conducted ‘a range of high-end training, 
including air defence and anti-submarine exercises, aviation, communications and at-sea 
replenishment between ships’ (Department of Defence Ministers Australia 2020).  
From the realist institutionalism second indicator, the decision-making structure, 
while the Quad so-called chain of command are currently semi-decentralized in a consensus 
form, the US progressively increasing its golden share in this regard. Indeed, the United States 
remains the single most important driver of any meaningful Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) 
strategy against China expansion, and such discourse only gained real traction once the US 
President Donald Trump embraced it at the 2017 APEC Summit and his administration 
released the National Security Strategy (NSS) as their first foreign policy strategy. From the 
US part, Washington’s most significant change was the May 2018 rebranding of the United 
States Pacific Command (USPACOM) to United States Indo-Pacific Command 
(USINDOPACOM). Although USPACOM had been operating in the Indian Ocean even before 
the change took place, the original name was a strategic reflection towards the western 
Pacific in the post–WWII era. The renaming also reflects USINDOPACOM’s theatre more 
inclusively since it includes 36 countries across all the sub-regions as well as both the Pacific 
and Indian Oceans between India to the West and the border of the US Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ) to the North and East (Kliem 2020). Ultimately, Washington’s more robust push-
back against Chinese expansion, both in terms of economic and security terms, was 
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consolidated during Trump administration (2016-2020). Washington clearly identifies China 
as the primary challenge and diagnoses a ‘geopolitical competition between free and 
repressive visions of world order’ (The White House, 2017, p. 45). For the United States’ vision 
to succeed, it must ‘redouble [U.S.] commitment to established alliances and partnerships, 
while expanding and deepening relationships with new partners’, in an effort to ‘[sustain] a 
favorable balance of power’, which ‘require[s] strong commitment and close cooperation 
with allies and partners because allies and partners magnify US power and extend US 
influence’ (The White House, 2017, p. 46).  
From the third indicator, namely from the perspective of power distribution within 
the Quad, the US under Trump administration did demand its partner to contribute 
meaningfully. In addition to the Chinese push-factor, the elevated threat level since the 
beginning of the Xi Jinping administration, the Quad revival followed a more robust US 
commitment to the region post-Obama. The heightened uncertainty regarding the future of 
America’s commitment in the Asia Pacific region after Trump had abandoned the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) and rebutted Obama’s pivot to Asia was to some extent alleviated by 
Washington’s more robust Indo-Pacific position and Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) 
(Huxley & Schreer, 2017). The most critical signal was the State Secretary Mike Pompeo’s 
comments following the outcome of the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration tribunal that 
delivers victory to the Philippines against the Chinese illegal Nine dash line claim at the South 
China Sea: ‘We have reconvened the Quad […] that had been dormant for nine years […]. This 
will prove very important in the efforts ahead, ensuring that China retains only its proper 
place in the world’ (Marlow, 2019). In addition, the US promised to redouble its commitment 
to established partnerships, while expanding and deepening relationships with new partners 
that share their concerns through the National Security Strategy (NSS) (The White House, 
2017, p. 46). Indeed, the emergence of Quad into the contemporary Indo-Pacific stage is 
characterised by this mutually reinforcing dynamic of able and willing middle powers on the 
one hand, and a reliable, yet demanding American partner on the other (Kliem 2020).  
However, the consensus and decentralized decision-making structure of the Quad also 
take a toll on its complete transformation into a full-fledge military alliance that makes the 
Quad is not going to play a major military role any time soon. In October 2020, Prime Minister 
Yoshihide Suga kicked off his trip to Vietnam and Indonesia where he repeatedly reassured 
his partners that Japan does not intend to create an “Asian NATO,” implicitly referring to the 
Quad. Similarly, on the eve of the 2021 March Quad Summit, the Australian Prime Minister 
Scott Morrison stated that the Quad will remain informal. India’s diplomatic protests against 
U.S. Navy operations within India’s exclusive economic zone in the same year reveal another 
strategic gap in the Quad’s current decision-making structure. 
In terms of size, the Quad alliance of four countries greatly affected its cohesion and 
streamline the costs associated with possible multilateral war fighting in the future. The 




Quad’s current small members also promising in terms of easy access to each other’s ports 
and airfields.  The signing of Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) mean that 
all the partnerships within the Australia-Japan-U.S. trilateral relationship have an RAA or 
Status of Forces Agreement. A more critical progress from the perspective of realist 
institutionalism is this: bilateral military ties among all four Quad members is strengthened. 
India’s defense ties with the US are growing quickly, purchasing a huge array of U.S.-made 
military hardware, with U.S. defense sales to India increased to more than $20 
billion. Australia and Japan are also expanding their defense ties with India. And all three are 
heartened that India has set up a tri-services command in the strategically important 
Andaman and Nicobar islands just north of the Malacca Strait. The recent landing of a U.S. P-
8 anti-submarine warfare aircraft in the Andamans for the first time suggests that this has 
opened new avenues for maritime security cooperation (Borah 2020). 
However, Quad in reality still need to do more to be an Asian NATO. The first issue is 
the fact that NATO represented a grand strategy of culturally similar Western nations with a 
mutual history of trust and cooperation forged through post-WWII and Cold War conflicts and 
crises. NATO members not only equally shared a perception of Moscow as a threat, but their 
zero economic, trade, investment, or any commercial entanglement with the insular Soviet 
bloc made it uncomplicated for them to work strongly towards the goal of strategic 
containment (Chowdhury 2021). Contrast that with Quad, where almost all countries share 
critical economic interdependence with China. Beijing is Tokyo’s largest export market and 
trading partner, representing more than 20 percent of Japan’s total trade. China is also the 
largest trading partner of Australia, accounting for about 30 percent of Australia’s trade with 
the world. Close to 40 percent of Australian goods exports go to China, which in turn supplies 
27 percent of all goods imported into Australia. Even for India, which has a live boundary 
dispute with China that flared up in a bloody conflict in the Himalayas last year, China is 
the largest trading partner. Total imports from China are more than India’s purchases from 
the US, its second largest trade partner. 
Nevertheless, if one considering the possible conflict against China, the 
interoperability challenges might grow but not in an overtly negative way. This is following 
the US concurrent strategic partnership building in the region; not only Washington has 
consolidated its strategic cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India, but also with other key 
ASEAN states like Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines as well as with South Korea and 
Taiwan. While improved naval interoperability and expanded information sharing will be 
valuable to the members, the speed of advance will be restrained by geopolitical 
considerations. There are other areas where the Quad can act to deliver immediate impact 
to regional maritime security. With the signing of the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement 
(MLSA) between India and Australia in June 2020, all of the bilateral partnerships within the 
Quad now include an MLSA or Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). These 
arrangements is an imperative step toward the interoperability of cooperative logistics, but 
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to endure any real conflict, they are not only need to be developed, but also tested and 
practiced through regular use. Such cooperation creates efficiencies and by leaning on each 
other’s logistics networks, partners gain expanded operational flexibility while at the same 
time streamlining lowers transaction costs. This is precisely how the Quad cooperation can 
inspire and empower similar efficiencies among other like-minded regional states. 
Finally, in terms of the Quad’s legitimacy, it is obviously inhere to the shared Free and 
Open Indo-Pacific vision, rather than inhere in the size of the coalition or alliance. Bradford 
(2021), for instance, stated that despite lacking strategic alignment across the full spectrum 
of security issues, the strategic interest of Quad members mostly converged and compatible 
between one and another – especially regarding critical elements in the maritime domain. In 
their joint statement, the Quad leaders pledged to “facilitate collaboration, including in 
maritime security, to meet challenges to the rules-based maritime order in the East and South 
China Seas.” The importance of freedom of navigation and the priority of international law in 
the maritime domain, particularly as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS), has been frequently highlighted and emphasized. In recent years, the 
Quad also has focused progress on enhancing naval interoperability while improving maritime 
intelligence and information cooperation. The 2020 return of the Royal Australian Navy to the 
Malabar exercise which since 2016 had been a trilateral India-Japan-U.S. event is a significant 
signs of increased naval interoperability. At one time, Malabar was more of a diplomatic 
symbol rather than a significant military alliance. But in recent years it has progressed to 
feature advanced tactics and serious training for potential cooperative warfighters as 
preconditioned by realist institutionalism. 
 
Conclusion 
In the light of tectonic geopolitical shifts in the Indo-Pacific region, the re-emergence 
of Quad provides the Washington’s regional partners a multi-pronged strategy of internal and 
double external balancing as indicated by realist institutionalism. In addition to strengthening 
their own defence capability and continuing support, Japan, India, and Australia have 
simultaneously pursued efforts to develop stronger ties among themselves, as likeminded 
partners who share the strategic goal of wanting to push back against an increasingly 
powerful China. This article set out to achieve two things and answer one puzzle: it aimed to 
provide an analysis of Quad and connect it to realist institutionalism theoretical perspective 
of multilateral military institution; it subsequently attempted to locate Quad firmly in IR 
theory. By completing these tasks, this article’s contribution is twofold: first, it has added a 
comprehensive account of the Quad to the existing literature and second, it has provided 
most up to date empirical evidence that amidst structural changes in the regional 
environment, it is the propositions of realist institutionalism that help to make sense of 
agents’ immediate responses to structural change. 




In a nutshell, the US is not in absolute decline. Indeed, under the Trump administration 
Washington has been stepping up its hard power in both oceans of Indo-Pacific: Indian Ocean 
and the South China Sea. The current gap between China and the United States may diminish 
further as a result of continued Chinese economic growth. But Beijing will not be able to push 
the US out of the Indo-Pacific in the foreseeable future, which will give Washington more time 
and space to increase the Quad’s internal and external defence capabilities and relationship. 
However, the undeniable relative decline of the US economic and military power requires 
joint solutions together with regional middle powers like Indonesia, Vietnam, and South 
Korea who do not wish to see China as a regional hegemon, and multilateral checking-
institution like Quad will be indispensable. Indeed, the potential for future expansion of the 
Quad with other quasi-alliances of likeminded partners are the likely future of Indo-Pacific 
security.  
In essence, there are a few key principles that are imperative to determine any further 
military institutional progress by the Quad: First, the United States, as the world’s only 
superpower with less time to maintain that particular status, will have to continue to take the 
lead, while middle power countries like India and Japan will also have to shed their reticence 
vis-à-vis China. Finally, the Quad countries will need to coordinate to implement economic 
decoupling with China, as Beijing continues to take advantage of its imbalanced trade 
relationships upon countries like Malaysia, Cambodia, Laos, and other nations in the Indo-
Pacific region (Abadi 2021). Nevertheless, shortfalls in strategic alignment and insufficient 
mutual trust constrain the Quad from evolving into a formal arrangement or a military alliance 
in the immediate future. Indeed, a contentious future where continued aggressive and illegal 
actions by Beijing drive all four Quad member states into closer strategic alignment is certainly 
possible, if not inevitable. While geopolitical forces control the pace of Quad efforts to build 
interoperability and enhance intelligence coordination, Bradford (2021) urged the members’ 
maritime planners to steam forward at ‘full speed’ with initiatives focused on logistics 
cooperation, mutual access, and coordinated maritime capacity building which will provide 
the essential foundations for the type of military cooperation that will be desired when 
greater strategic alignment – and eventual threat – arrived.  
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